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FOREWORD: WHY RETRY? REVIVING
DORMANT RACIAL JUSTICE CLAIMS
Martha Minow*

"A patched and leaky vase may be less desirable than an unbroken vase,
but it is better than a pile of shards."
- Marc Galanter1

Two familiar arguments oppose lawsuits and legislative efforts to
address racial injustices from our national past,2 and a third tacit
argument can be discerned. "Why open old wounds?": this question
animates the first argument. The evidence is stale - this expresses the
second argument. The third, less explicit objection reflects worries that
exposing some gross and unremedied racial injustices from the past
will reveal the scale of imperfections in the systems of justice and gov
ernment and thereby undermine the legitimacy of those systems. To
introduce the meticulous and passionate essays in this Colloquium, I
elaborate and respond to each of these questions. Like the
Colloquium authors, I think it far more important that public attention
come to these issues than that any particular remedy be secured. For
inattention has been the insult laid upon the injuries of the past.
I.

WHY OPEN OLD WOUNDS?

Reopening old wounds is treated as an argument against litigation
when time has passed since the underlying events. To some, even two
years can seem like sufficient time for injuries to recede into a past
that should not be disturbed. One editorial writer recently urged a

* Professor, Harvard Law School. A.B. 1975, University of Michigan; Ed.M. 1976, Har
vard University; J.D. 1979, Yale. - Ed.

1. Marc Galanter, Righting Old Wrongs, in MARTHA
124 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2002).

OF HATRED 107,

MINOW, BREAKING THE CYCLES

2. In 2001 , the criminal justice system prosecuted Thomas Blanton for the deaths of
Denise McNair, Carole Robertson, Cynthia Wesley, and Addie Mae Collins, four young
African-American girls, in the bombing of a Birmingham, Alabama church. Robert
Chambliss was also convicted of the bombing in 1977. See Stephanie McCrummen, The Ver
dier: Guilty: Jury Convicts Man in '63 Church Bombing That Killed 4 Girls, NEWSDAY (Long
Island), May 23, 2002, at A7. For detailed consideration of this and similar efforts, see
Anthony V. Alfieri, Retrying Race, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1141 (2003); Richard Delgado, White
Interests and Civil Rights Realism: Rodrigo's Bittersweet Epiphany, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1201
(2003); Margaret M. Russell, Cleansing Moments and Retrospective Justice, 101 MICH. L.
RE V. 1225 (2003); and Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Racial Justice on Trial-Again:
African American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L. REV.
1269 (2003).
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district attorney to drop a potential prosecution that arose when a
homeless couple accidentally started a fire in a vacant warehouse that
led to the death of six firefighters.3 "All a trial would accomplish now
is to reopen old wounds in a city that has already spent two years
grieving. "4
In that situation, the pursuit of justice seems to interrupt or
undermine a process of mourning, a process that involves ceremonies,
memorials, grief, and private memory.5 Though blame could be found,
the editorial argued that the wrongdoers needed no trial because they
already suffered "the hell of living with what they have done."6 This
notion that wrongdoers have suffered enough, however, is absent
when the underlying harms arose not by negligence but hate, and
when the wrongdoers actually boast about their behavior and remain
unrepentant.
Sometimes the worry about reopening old wounds comes with the
acknowledgment that the conflicts are still raw. Proposed trials could
"reopen old wounds and plunge the country back into civil war,"
commented one observer after representatives of the United Nations
withdrew from plans to set up a special court to prosecute former
leaders of the Khmer Rouge for 1.7 million deaths in Cambodia
during the 1970s.7 Although the underlying events reach back several
decades, civil war persisted until 1998.8 It seems therefore a bit odd to
talk of "old wounds." Perhaps people warn against reopening the
conflicts precisely because they are so fresh and barely ended. In other
words, arguments against opening old wounds - whether in
Cambodia, the United States, or elsewhere - may stand in for worry
about current social disorder and the fragility of peace. Yet however
uncomfortable discussions of the racial past may be in this country,
can there be any honest worry about social instability if we address the
old wounds concerning racial violence of the 1960s and 1970s? Of
course, addressing past racial violence has a bearing on the present
day examinations of affirmative action, racial profiling, and other
social policies, but basic peace and social order are not in jeopardy.
Some worry that assessing past incidents risks undermining current
efforts to build trust across racial lines. Shootings killed two white

3. Adrian Walker, A Trial For What?, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. I, 2002, at Bl.
4.

Id.

5.

Id.

6.

Id.

7. Irwin Arieff Ta Mok, UN Walks Out of Cambodia Talks on War Crimes Courts, THE
INDEPENDENT ( London) , Feb. 9, 2002, at 13. Cambodian and U.N. negotiators subsequently

reached a tentative agreement to create a tribunal to prosecute former Khmer Rouge lead
ers for genocide. See Ellen Nakashima, Pact Raises Hope in Cambodia for Khmer Rouge
Trials, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2003, at A26.
8. Mok, supra note 7.
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police officers and a black youth, allegedly a gang member, over a
two-week period in August of 2002 in Minneapolis, Minnesota.9 Given
long-standing friction between white police officers and African
Americans in Minneapolis, one editorial warned that evaluation of
each incident would risk reopening memories of prior incidents,
clouding judgments about the present, and dissolving current efforts to
build trust between the police and the community.10 Once again, this
kind of worry cannot be raised in the notable recent efforts to bring
litigation or seek reparations concerning civil rights abuses of the
1960s and 1970s or slavery. Indeed, it is precisely because of growing
trust and real progress toward fairness and objectivity in the local legal
systems that current-day efforts turn to these systems for redress for
unremedied racial injustices.
Perhaps criminal prosecutions or any kind of adversarial litigation
hold special jeopardy for opening old wounds from racial injustice.
This point animates some features of the restorative justice move
ment, an international effort of theorists and practitioners, to engage
victims and community members with wrongdoers in forward-looking
processes of justice-seeking reparations and healing.11 Is it a legitimate
concern that focusing the machinery of justice on past, unremedied
racial harms could produce pain for the perpetrators? Racial riots
ripped York, Pennsylvania, in 1969, wounding sixty people; a white
mob killed Lillie Belle Allen, a preacher's daughter.12 Despite the
filing of criminal charges, the prosecutions lay dormant for thirty years
until local newspapers revived the matter; prosecutors then reopened
the investigation. One man, apparently involved in killing Allen,
called to assist the prosecutors but then committed suicide.13
The costs of adversarial justice might seem unwarranted if repara
tions and healing are genuine alternatives. But what are the possibili
ties for personal and communal healing after racial violence? This
question animates the international restorative justice movement. Its
9. Editorial, Take A Breath: Cops,
(Minneapolis), Aug. 17, 2002, at 20A.
10.

Community Must Work Together, STAR TRIB.

Id.

11. See RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Burt Gallaway & Joe
Hudson eds., 1996); Elizabeth Latif, Note, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored
Toward Legal Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV. 289, 292-93 (2001) (summarizing the restorative
justice movement).
12.
at 807;

Ex-Mayor Acquitted, 2 Convicted in '69 Race Killing, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 20, 2002,
see also Combined News Services, Still Guilty in Some Eyes: Town Divided in Ac

quittal of Mayor in 1969 York Race Riot, NEWSDAY, Oct. 21, 2002, at Al2; Jennifer McMen
York Case Handed Prison Sentences: Pair of White Men Guilty in Black
Woman's Death Get at Least 4 112, 9 Years, BALT . SUN, Dec. 19, 2002, at 3A.

amin, 2 Convicted in

13. McMenamin, supra note 12. One of the police officers at the time, Charlie Robert
son, later admitted that he shouted "white power" at a gang rally. Others blamed him for
encouraging gunmen to shoot blacks during the riots. Robertson later was elected mayor for
two terms; he also later apologized for his earlier racial views. Id.
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adherents argue that restoring the dignity of individuals and the
harmony of communities should be the goal of justice. Exemplified by
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("TRC"),
restorative justice does not mean doing nothing, but it may mean
pursuing alternatives to criminal prosecutions and civil trials.14 Hence,
to fulfill the aspiration of building a bridge between the Apartheid era
and the vision of a new democratic South Africa, the TRC held
hearings to give victims and survivors opportunities to tell their
stories. The TRC also considered applications for amnesty from
perpetrators of human rights violations, whether committed by police
and government officials or by freedom fighters and resisters of the
Apartheid regime. Some critics attacked the TRC for supplanting
criminal prosecutions.15 Yet still others opposed the TRC and its
hearings because they would reopen old wounds. Judge Richard
Goldstone of South Africa's Constitutional Court noted that he heard
such complaints from many white South Africans:
To whose wounds, I have wondered, are they referring? Surely not their
own. And, what makes them think that the wounds of the victims have
healed? And yet, when I said this to the playwright Ariel Dorfman, he
corrected me in his always gentle and wise manner. He pointed out that
those white South Africans are also victims of apartheid. Their discom
fort with the truth is a symptom of their shame and that, too, makes them
victims.16

Does this generous view from South Africa warn against legal
responses to past racial injustice in America? Those who favor
restorative justice could argue that whites along with blacks need the
processes of social reconstruction that can emerge after a community
faces its past. Criminal prosecution and civil litigation can also help
communities face their past and establish how the current generation
means to break from it. Rather than reopening old wounds, legal
attention to past racial crimes could start the process of healing
wounds that have festered for decades. Even the debate over whether
to proceed with prosecutions, civil suits, or reparations can bring into
the open secrets about the past, afford people on all sides a chance to
tell the truth, explain their motivations and suffering, apologize, and
make amends.

14. For a longer discussion, see MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 53-90 (1998)
[hereinafter MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS).
15.

See id. at

56, 81.

16. Judge Richard Goldstone, Foreword to MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS, supra note 14, at ix, xii; see also JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME
(1963), reprinted in JAMES BALDWIN, COLLECTED ESSAYS 286 (1998) (exploring harms to
whites from white supremacy).
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Thus, arguments using the metaphor of "opening old wounds"
should not halt contemporary efforts to pursue legal redress for past
racial injustices. There is no risk of societal disorder at the level of a
civil war to cause hesitation in such pursuits. On the other hand, nor is
there such harmony and mutual understanding that lawsuits and
reparations claims arising from past race-based injustices could fairly
be charged with introducing conflict to otherwise happy communities.
To the extent that whites as well as blacks feel victimized by the past,
attention and examination would be better than doing nothing. Should
the lawsuits or reparations struggles prove controversial, the emerging
debates themselves offer a chance for people to air their views and
learn about the views of others on issues that have enduring signifi
cance and consequences for future relationships and rules.
II.

BUT THE E VI DENCE IS STALE

An obvious objection to litigation proceeding decades after the
underlying events occurred is that the evidence is stale, unreliable, or
unavailable. The truth-seeking function of trials is jeopardized when
evidence is absent or untrustworthy. With the passage of time,
memories may become foggy or influenced by intervening events.
Documents disappear. Witnesses die. Concerns about weakness in
evidence underlie the statute of limitations that usually applies to any
claim. Statutes of limitations also protect courts from excessive litiga
tion and defendants from endless uncertainty about the possibility of
future litigation.
As powerful as these goals may be in most areas of law, they fade
in the context of gross violations of human rights. In U.S. law, there is
no statute of limitations restricting prosecutions for murder.17 There is
no statute of limitations on the prosecution and punishment of the
crime of genocide.18 The International Criminal Court Statute
mandates that crimes within its jurisdiction "shall not be subject to any
statute of limitations."19 European nations have joined a convention
17. See MARYANNE VOLLERS, GHOSTS OF MISSISSIPPI: THE MURDER OF MEDGAR
EVERS, THE TRIALS OF BYRON DE LA BECKWITH, AND THE HAUNTING OF THE NEW
SOUTH (1995); Todd Taylor, Exorcising the Ghosts of a Shameful Past: The Third Trial and
Conviction of Byron de la Beckwith, 16 B .C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 359 (1996).
18. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 40,
U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968) (entered into force Nov. 11, 1970), available at http:/1157.150.
195.3/LibertyX::URd7xUul5qE8QjU1V2QmZG8x; see Matthew Lippman, Genocide: The
Crime of the Century: The Jurisprudence of Death at the Dawn of the New Millennium, 23
HOUS. J. INT'L L. 467, 488 (2001).
19. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 29, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9, 37 l.L.M. 999 (entered into force July 1, 2002), available at
http:/lwww.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2003); see
Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States of America and the
International Criminal Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 381 (2002).
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exempting crimes against humanity as well as genocide from statutes
of limitations.20 These exemptions from statutes of limitations reflect
the recognition that some offenses are so serious that they deserve
response whenever possible. They may also reflect the understanding
that loss of memory and evidence are less likely where the offenses are
extreme and heinous. The French Criminal Code, for example, adopts
the view that crimes against humanity are "imprescriptible," meaning
both exempt from the statute of limitations and unforgettable.21
Although it is not uncontroversial to exempt some matters from stat
utes of limitations,22 doing so reflects the commitment that "justice, no
matter how late, can and will be served."23 Or, as Lord David Owen
quoted Simon Wiesenthal who, in turn, attributed Robert Kennedy,
"'Moral duties have no term.' "24 Here, as elsewhere, U.S. law should
be informed by emerging international human rights ideas and accom
plishments.25 The U.S. thus could learn from emerging international
norms that set no time limit on the pursuit of justice for gross viola
tions of human rights.
Other considerations - such as the pursuit of social reintegration
or reconciliation - may support the use of truth commissions rather
than criminal prosecutions.26 Concerns about the passage of time,

20. See Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 18. The United States is not a p arty to the Convention
on Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations. See http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/

treaty6.htm (last modified Oct. 9, 2001) (listing participants and signatories to the Conven
tion).

21. Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Legalization of Racism in a Constitutional State: De
mocracy's Suicide in Vichy France, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 74 & n.254 (1998); see C. PEN. ART.
213-5 (1994), reprinted in THE FRENCH PENAL CODE OF 1994 AS AMENDED AS OF
JANUARY 1, 1999, at 93 (Edward A. Tomlinson, trans., The American Series of Foreign Pe
nal Codes No. 31, 1999).

22. "The issue of whether crimes against humanity should be without any limitations period
continues to divide France. One of France's foremost philosophers, who was also a Jewish Resis
tance hero, answered the question resoundingly in the affirmative in his book, appropriately enti
tled L 'fmprescriptibfe." Curran, supra note 21, at 74 & n.254. (citing VLADIMIR JANKELEVITCH.
L'IMPRESCRIPTIBLE: PARDONNER? DANS L'HONNEUR ET LA DIGNITE (1986)). For a French legal
scholar's similar conclusion, see Georges Levasseur, Les Crimes contre l'humanite et le probleme de
fe11r prescription. 93 J. DE DROIT INT'L 259, 273-86 (1966). For a recent discussion of the issue in
the context of Paul Touvier's trial, see Leila Sadat Wexler, Reflexions on the Trial of Vichy Col
laborator Paul To11vier for Crimes Against Humanity in France. 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 191 (1995).
23. Taylor,

supra

note 17, at 379.

24. Lord David Owen, Reconciliation, Applying Historical Lessons to Modem Conflicts,
19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 324, 329 (1995) (citing SIMON WIESENTHAL, JUSTICE NOT
VENGEANCE 158 (1989)).
25.

See Yamamoto

et al., supra note 2.

26. See MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS, supra note 14, at 55-89,
118-147; Rose Weston, Note, Facing the Past, Facing the Future: Applying the Truth Com
mission Model to the Historic Treatment of Native Americans in the United States, 18 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 1017 {2001).
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however, should not prevent concerted efforts to address mass injus
tices whose effects persist.
III. THE SCALE OF UNREMEDIED WRONGS COULD JEOPARDIZE
FAITH IN THE SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE
I suspect that implicit in objections to legal redress for past racial
crimes and atrocities is the fear of acknowledging the extent of those
crimes and the resulting scope of official failure to prevent or respond.
Such acknowledgment would raise questions about the legitimacy and
reliability of a legal system intended to enact justice. It could also
reveal the extent of reliance upon and benefits from the past injustices
in the lives of people who currently feel innocent and indeed, did not
themselves commit the atrocities. Reopening past injustices for legal
treatment, in turn, might cast doubt on the legitimacy of current
allocations of power and privilege or call upon people to make amends
for conduct of others who are long gone. Resistance to making such
amends - and assertions that justice does not so demand - may
reinforce opposition to efforts to litigate or pursue reparations for past
racial injustices. Such resistance is summarized in an aphorism in the
United States: "After all, we can't give back Manhattan."27
Fair questions can be raised about what obligations current gen
erations do or should have for the violations of their ancestors or
those of their same race who preceded them.28 Why should children or
grandchildren of wrongdoers or bystanders owe any duty to remedy
their ancestors' failures? Why would legal rulings pressing such an
obligation rooted in the past better advance justice than collective
actions designed to redress present day inequities, regardless of their
provenance? Yet those questions do not themselves justify barring
lawsuits or legislative investigations into past racial injustice. Deter
mining what happened is a vital step in the pursuit of justice; it
precedes but does not determine the rationale for or scope of reme
dies, nor indeed, who specifically should be liable.
Some may worry that contemporary use of courts in matters about
which courts remained silent for decades exposes the vulnerability of
the judiciary to politics and prejudice. That vulnerability remains all
too apparent to those who have waited long for justice. If the judiciary
becomes active now in allowing hearings of neglected criminal and
civil complaints from decades earlier, it can start to rectify its own
failures from those earlier periods. In so doing, the courts can help
establish reasons for current and future generations to lodge faith in
them. This is surely in the interests of whites, blacks, and members of

27. See Weston, supra note 26, at 1055 n.250.
28. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS

4 (1992).
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other minority groups.29 Yes, prosecutors and courts proceeding now
when they did not do so in a timely fashion will expose their own
failures - or in Marc Galanter's image, the patches and leaks in the
vase. But, he continues, "When it comes to justice, we don't have the
choice of the unbroken vase. A patched and blemished world is the
only one we can attain."30 Rather than dwell in the broken shards of
justice, let us do the work of repair. The poignant and powerful essays
in this Colloquium are part of that important work.

29. See Delgado, supra

30.

note 2.

Galanter, supra note 1, at 124.

